

## CLAIMS

What is claimed is:

1. A method of preventing buffer overrun security vulnerabilities comprising:  
executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a stack;  
executing a called function; and  
executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space from  
the stack.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified call routine comprises:  
placing a return address for the called function on the stack;  
calculating a random number;  
saving said random number in a secure location;  
placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;  
building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and  
setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein said location is a processor register that is not generally  
accessible.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified return routine comprises:  
recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;  
removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;  
retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and

5 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

1 5. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified call routine comprises:

2 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;

3 calculating a hash value of stack invariants;

4 saving said hash value in a secure location; and

5 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

1 6. The method of claim 5, wherein said secure location is a processor register that is not  
generally accessible.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein said modified return routine comprises:

calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;

determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an  
execution of said modified call routine;

executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first  
hash value; and

setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value  
matches said first hash value.

1 8. A method of preventing buffer overrun security vulnerabilities comprising:

2 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is installed;

3 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;

4 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

1 9. The method of claim 8, wherein said method is performed when said executable is installed.

1 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising saving said executable.

1 11. The method of claim 8, wherein said method is performed when said executable is loaded.

1 12. An apparatus comprising:

2 a storage device having stored therein one or more routines for preventing buffer overrun

3 security vulnerabilities; and

4 a processor coupled to the storage device for executing the one or more routines that, when

5 executing the routines, prevents buffer overrun errors by:

6 executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a

7 stack;

8 executing a called function; and

9 executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space

10 from the stack.

1 13. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified call routine comprises:

2 placing a return address for the called function on the stack;

3 calculating a random number;

4 saving said random number in a secure location;

5 placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;

6 building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and

7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.

1 14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein said location is a processor register that is not generally  
2 accessible.

1 15. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified return routine comprises:  
2 recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;  
3 removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;  
4 retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and  
5 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

16. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified call routine comprises:  
placing a return address for the called function on the stack;  
calculating a hash value of stack invariants;  
saving said hash value in a secure location; and  
building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

17. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein said secure location is a processor register that is not  
generally accessible.

1 18. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein said modified return routine comprises:  
2 calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;  
3 determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an  
4 execution of said modified call routine;  
5 executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first  
6 hash value; and

7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value  
8 matches said first hash value.

- 1 19. An apparatus comprising:  
2 a storage device having stored therein one or more routines for preventing buffer overrun  
3 security vulnerabilities; and  
4 a processor coupled to the storage device for executing the one or more routines that, when  
5 executing the routines, prevents buffer overrun errors by:  
6 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is  
7 installed;  
8 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;  
9 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

- 10 20. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein said method is performed when said executable is  
11 installed.

- 12 21. The apparatus of claim 20, further comprising saving said executable.

- 13 22. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein said method is performed when said executable is loaded.

- 14 23. A machine-readable medium having stored thereon data representing sequences of  
15 instructions, said sequences of instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause said  
16 processor to prevents buffer overrun errors by:  
17 executing a modified call routine for placing a random amount of empty space onto a stack;  
18 executing a called function; and

6           executing a modified return routine for removing said random amount of empty space from  
7           the stack.

1   24.   The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified call routine comprises:  
2       placing a return address for the called function on the stack;  
3       calculating a random number;  
4       saving said random number in a secure location;  
5       placing a plurality of blank bytes equal to the random number onto the stack;  
6       building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack; and  
7       setting an end of stack pointer to an end of the stack frame.

25.   The machine-readable medium of claim 24, wherein said location is a processor register that  
      is not generally accessible.

26.   The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified return routine comprises:  
      recalling a random number saved during an execution of said modified call routine;  
      removing a number of bytes equal to said random number from the stack;  
      retrieving a return address for the called function from the stack; and  
      setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame.

1   27.   The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified call routine comprises:  
2       placing a return address for the called function on the stack;  
3       calculating a hash value of stack invariants;  
4       saving said hash value in a secure location; and  
5       building a stack frame by placing values from the called function onto the stack.

1 28. The machine-readable medium of claim 27, wherein said secure location is a processor  
2 register that is not generally accessible.

1 29. The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein said modified return routine comprises:  
2 calculating a second hash value of stack invariants;  
3 determining whether said second hash value matches a first hash value calculated during an  
4 execution of said modified call routine;  
5 executing a stack corruption exception if said second hash value does not match said first  
6 hash value; and  
7 setting an end of stack pointer to an end of a previous stack frame if said second hash value  
8 matches said first hash value.

1 30. A machine-readable medium having stored thereon data representing sequences of  
2 instructions, said sequences of instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause said  
3 processor to prevent buffer overrun errors by:  
4 searching an executable program for all function calls at the time the executable is installed;  
5 adding a random amount of blank space to all stacks generated by said function calls;  
6 adjusting all references to said stacks to compensate for said blank space.

1 31. The machine-readable medium of claim 30, wherein said method is performed when said  
2 executable is installed.

1 32. The machine-readable medium of claim 31, further comprising saving said executable.

1 33. The machine-readable medium of claim 30, wherein said method is performed when said  
2 executable is loaded.

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